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Abstract: Governing common pool resources (CPR) in the face of distur-
bances such as globalization and climate change is challenging. The outcome of 
any CPR governance regime is the influenced by local combinations of social, 
institutional, and biophysical factors, as well as cross-scale interdependen-
cies. In this study, we take a step towards understanding multiple-causation of 
CPR outcomes by analyzing (1) the co-occurrence of design principles (DPs) 
by activity (irrigation, fishery and forestry), and (2) the combination(s) of DPs 
leading to social and ecological success. We analyzed 69 cases pertaining to 
three different activities: irrigation, fishery, and forestry. We find that the impor-
tance of the design principles is dependent upon the natural and hard human 
made infrastructure (i.e. canals, equipment, vessels etc.). For example, clearly 
defined social boundaries are important when the natural infrastructure is highly 
mobile (i.e. tuna fish), while monitoring is more important when the natural 
infrastructure is more static (i.e. forests or water contained within an irrigation 
system). However, we also find that congruence between local conditions and 
rules and proportionality between investment and extraction are key for CPR 
success independent from the natural and human hard made infrastructure. We 
further provide new visualization techniques for co-occurrence patterns and add 
to qualitative comparative analysis by introducing a reliability metric to deal 
with a large meta-analysis dataset on secondary data where information is miss-
ing or uncertain.
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1. Introduction
As human activities begin to stress common-pool resources (CPRs) at the plan-
etary scale (e.g. the carbon assimilation capacity of the atmosphere and oceans, 
fresh water availability, etc.) developing the capacity to govern them is becoming 
ever more important. While we do understand some features of successful CPR 
governance, these past models of success are being confronted by unprecedented 
changes due to globalization and climate change. This challenges researchers to 
improve our practical understanding of the governance of CPR systems and their 
capacity to adapt in the face of such change.
Toward this end, this paper reports on a large-N comparative case study analy-
sis aimed at extending existing theories of CPR governance to gain deeper under-
standing of how the success of CPR systems depends on the broader coupled 
infrastructure system in which they are embedded. By coupled infrastructure sys-
tem (CIS) context we refer to the natural resource systems (i.e. natural infrastruc-
ture), the hard-human made infrastructure (i.e. technology), the soft human-made 
infrastructure (i.e. the protocols that allow production systems to work such as 
norms, institutions, rules in use etc.). By increasing our understanding of CPR 
governance, we can identify analytical tools and principles to enhance the adapt-
ability and transformability of CPR systems in the face of change.
Ostrom’s well-known institutional design principles (DPs) provide the foun-
dation for our work.
Since Hardin’s (1968) paper that prescribed either state control or the estab-
lishment of private property regimes to avoid the overuse of shared resources, 
there have been many studies showing that under certain conditions, resource 
users themselves are able to avoid the tragedy of the commons (McEvoy 1986; 
Berkes et al. 1989; Feeny et al. 1990). Communities with trust, reciprocity, and 
social cohesion could build norms and craft formal rules that enable collective 
action and prevent the deterioration of CPRs (Ostrom 1990). Based on a large 
number of case studies, Ostrom (1990) proposed the DPs as governance regime 
characteristics that enable resource users to engage in collective action to manage 
CPRs sustainably. Unfortunately, the DPs have often been viewed as a panacea 
(Steins and Edwards 1999; Cleaver 2002; Bruns 2007). Given Ostrom’s warning 
against panaceas (Anderies et al. 2007; Ostrom et al. 2007), we contend that such 
an interpretation does not reflect her (1990) analysis or intent. Rather, we suggest 
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that the DPs may be viewed as necessary conditions for successful CPR systems, 
contingent on the general CIS characteristics. Our aim in this paper is to clarify 
how clusters of DPs constitute necessary conditions for success and how these 
conditions depend on the CIS.
To explore necessary conditions for success, we assess the co-occurrence of 
DPs and identify configurations of DPs that may lead to successful CPR systems. 
This analysis addresses Young’s (2002) and Agrawal’s (2002) assertion that since 
the DPs were posited as generalized propositions, they should be comparable and 
their presence/absence should lead to specific outcomes regardless of other con-
textual variables. The fact that DPs are often suggested as necessary conditions 
suggests that if a community does not adopt them, they will not be able to solve 
their CPR problems. Cox et al. (2010) have made a first attempt to assess the 
possible relationship between DPs and social and/or ecological “success” by con-
ducting a case study meta-analysis. They found that the presence of each design 
principle (DP), taken individually, was significantly correlated with successful 
CPR systems (see also Ratajczyk et al. 2016). However, the presence of a single 
DP cannot explain why some CPR systems are successful and others are not. In 
fact, our analysis shows that success requires clusters of DPs and the presence or 
absence of individual DP’s tells us very little.
To explore the relationship between DP and CPR social-ecological systems 
we conceptualize the latter as specific cases of CIS (Yu et al. 2015, Anderies and 
Janssen 2016): systems in which the social system, technology, and the ecological 
system (all examples of infrastructure) interact at different temporal and spatial 
scales. The notion of CIS emphasizes the fact that the dynamics (and thus success) 
of CPR systems depends on the interplay between multiple types of infrastructure 
that define the social, technical, and ecological context (Poteete et al. 2010); none 
of which can be viewed in isolation. From the CIS perspective, DPs refer mainly 
to soft human-made infrastructure that is deeply interdependent with other types 
of infrastructure (i.e. hard human made – canals, artificial reefs, transportation 
etc. – and natural – watersheds, climate, biodiversity etc.).
To begin unravelling the relationship between soft (DPs), other types of infra-
structure, and success of CPR systems, we compare three main activities based 
on the need for human-made hard infrastructure (i.e. intensity – the amount of 
investment and effort needed to produce and maintain the necessary technology) 
and characteristics of the natural infrastructure (i.e. mobility):
1. irrigation, with intensive hard human-made infrastructure (canals) and 
mobile natural infrastructure (water);
2. fishery, with some range of intensity of hard human-made infrastructure 
(e.g. from small-skiffs to freezer-trawlers) and wide range of mobility of 
the natural infrastructure (e.g. from oysters to tuna);
3. forestry, with less intensive hard human-made infrastructure (e.g. forestry 
equipment) and a stationary natural infrastructure (e.g. forest products).
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This classification stems from the work of Schlager et al. (1994) on mobile and 
fixed resources, and on human-made hard infrastructure intensity following 
Anderies (2015), Anderies and Janssen (2016) and Yu et al. (2015).
In the remainder of the paper, we first visualize DP co-occurrence by looking 
at co-occurrence frequencies for successful and non-successful cases. We then 
assess DP configurations (clusters) and focus on the importance of these configu-
rations in determining success via Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Next, we 
look at how successful DP configurations change across the different activities: 
irrigation, fisheries, and forests. Finally, we discuss the importance of specific 
co-occurrence patterns that we assessed in cases representing successful and non-
successful CPR systems.
We conclude by identifying the limitations of this study and suggesting future 
lines of research required to develop a comprehensive approach to improve our 
understanding of CPR systems and, by extension, of CIS. Other papers in this spe-
cial feature take up two lines of this research. Barnett et al. (2016) take a deeper 
look at the other possible mediating factors using qualitative analysis of inconsis-
tencies identified in this paper. Ratajczyk et al. (2016) provide a detailed discus-
sion of issues related to data transparency and replicability of findings through 
coding procedures and methodology. Both papers complement the research pre-
sented here and give a more comprehensive picture of the relationship between 
DPs, and the CIS in which they are embedded.
2. Methods
To analyze the interdependencies and configurations of DPs related to success, we 
re-coded a subset of the cases presented in Cox et al. (2010) based on the reformu-
lation of the DPs made by Cox et al. (2010: Table 3). However, we used a different 
definition of success. Cox et al. (2010) defined “success” as cases that “reported 
successful long-term environmental management” (Cox et al. 2010, 40). Here, as 
in Barnett et al. (2016), successful cases are those that have not displayed ecologi-
cal deterioration (i.e. resource sustainability), nor conflict and trust issues accord-
ing to the secondary data sources at our disposal. A more in-depth discussion on 
how we measure success is given in Ratajczyk et al. 2016, which measures overall 
CPR success given evidence of resource sustainability, collective choice arrange-
ments and equity among users based on coding previously defined by Ostrom and 
colleagues (1989). By increasing the dimension of success, we reduce the likeli-
hood of miscoding cases as successful in which resources are harvested sustain-
ably albeit within highly socially contested situation.
We recoded 69 of the original Cox et al. (2010) cases (limiting the cases to 
those referring to irrigation, fishery or forestry), 27 of which were considered 
complete cases (i.e. all DPs and success variables were coded). A DP was coded 
as present if the original author explicitly stated this to be the case, or if the DP’s 
presence could be inferred based on the author’s description of the case. Each 
case was coded by a team of three coders. Coding teams used a systematic coding 
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protocol as detailed in Ratajczyk et al. (2016). We assessed possible discrepan-
cies between our final coding and the coding of Cox et al. (2010) (see appendix 
for details). The results of such analysis (reported in Table A2) highlight the need 
for better coding guidelines. The purpose of presenting such assessment is not to 
challenge the validity of any specific coding team but only to showcase an added 
layer of difficulty related to understanding the puzzle of governance via second-
ary data sources. We encourage the inclusion and reporting of coder agreement 
ratings for every meta-analysis in order to increase awareness of the importance 
of common coding guidelines that go beyond the simple questions present in a 
specific coding book or survey.
2.1. Analysis
To explore the relationship between DP configurations and success, we adopt two 
main methods: visualization of DP co-occurrence and qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA). The use of multiple methods allowed us to assess the validity of 
the results and to perform a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of our findings. 
Our analysis focuses on two main issues: (1) Do DPs co-occur? and (2) If they 
do co-occur, can we identify specific co-occurrence patterns associated with suc-
cess? We assess the co-occurrence by visually depicting DP co-occurrence in the 
coded cases.
We performed this analysis for all cases and for subsets of cases determined 
by the type of CPR activity (irrigation, fishery, forestry). Following a similar type 
of analysis, Rocha et al. (2015) analyzed the co-occurrence of drivers in marine 
regime shifts. DP visualization highlights possible underlying commonalities 
between cases that share the same DPs. This type of analysis represents a purely 
visual and qualitative exploratory first step. We assessed whether specific patterns 
of co-occurrence are associated with success via QCA. QCA analysis allowed us 
to assess the relationship between specific DP configurations and success. QCA, 
proposed and refined by Ragin (1987, 2006, 2008), allows for the comparison 
of case studies with respect to specific outcome variables. More precisely QCA 
relies on Boolean algebra for cross-case comparisons to reduce causal complexity 
into a minimal set of conditions necessary for an outcome (Ragin 1987). QCA 
establishes conditions of necessity and sufficiency. A condition is necessary if 
it must be present for a certain outcome to occur. A condition is sufficient if, by 
itself, it can produce a certain outcome (Ragin 1987). A condition is both nec-
essary and sufficient if it is the only cause to the outcome. We employed QCA 
because approaches that are centered on linear relations between variables are not 
conceptually correct given their focus on variable distributions instead of focusing 
on case-by-case configurations (Kent 2009). However, QCA is very sensitive to 
missing or uncertain information and can be used only to analyze cases for which 
complete information is available. Unfortunately, with a large dataset containing 
cases spanning different time-frames, locations and resources, complete informa-
tion is not available for all cases. Accordingly, we combined QCA analysis with 
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a reliability metric based on missing values imputation to increase the data reli-
ability of our results. Our “reliability” metric sets a confidence (reliability) range 
to the information normally presented with QCA (i.e. consistency and coverage). 
Reliability is especially important in our work because, e.g. QCA performed on 
the 27 complete cases led to the elicitation of specific DPs as necessary conditions 
for success. However, the conclusions derived from the 27 complete cases may 
not apply to the remaining 42 cases where data is incomplete and generalizations 
are not possible. Using reliability as an added metric to the QCA analysis allowed 
us to increase our sample and test the validity of the complete cases with QCA.
To assess the reliability of our results, we performed QCA on the 27 complete 
cases and complemented that information with two other QCA analyses: one on 
the dataset where we assume missing data=absent (DP−) (i.e. effectively setting 
all missing values to 0) and one in which we assume missing data=present (DP+) 
(i.e. effectively setting all missing values to 1). This QCA performed on DP− and 
DP+ represent the boundaries of the analysis, or, in other words, the boundary 
values of the QCA metrics and the validity of the different solution sets. We then 
define reliability of coverage as 1 – standard deviation of coverage scores of the 
three QCA analysis; the reliability of consistency as 1 – standard deviation of 
consistency scores of the three QCA performed. Since consistency and cover-
age range from 0 to 1, our reliability metric also exhibited this range. Finally, we 
assessed solution reliability as the number of times a specific set was reported in 
the solution set. If a specific set was not reported as a solution in one of the QCA 
performed, we implied that coverage and consistency=0.
3. Results
3.1. Data description
Of the 69 cases analyzed, 25 were forestry cases, 24 were irrigation systems, and 
20 were fisheries. Table 1 is an overview of success by activity, while Table 2 
summarizes the data regarding the presence or absence of the DPs. The whole 
dataset is fairly balanced and not heavily skewed towards one type of outcome or 
activity. Table 2 shows a noticeable difference in missing values per activity and 
per DP. Further, some DPs are heavily skewed towards being present rather than 
absent.
Table 1: Success by activity.
Activity Success Total
No (0) Yes (1)
Forestry 11 (44%) 14 (56%) 25 (36%)
Irrigation 10 (42%) 14 (58%) 24 (35%)
Fisheries  9 (45%) 11 (55%) 20 (29%)
Total 30 (43%) 39 (57%) 69 
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At first glance, the presence or absence of a specific DP does not seem to fol-
low a specific pattern. Missing values seem to occur predominantly in the fishery 
activity. One might speculate that, in general, given the area covered by fishermen 
and the nature of the resource, DPs in fisheries are difficult to assess. Generally, 
when DPs are coded, their presence is more likely than their absence. Regardless 
of the specific DPs identified, increasing the number of DPs present in a case 
study generally relates to a higher likelihood of success in a CPR (see Figure 1). 
Successful cases had a significantly higher average of 8.7±2.6 (max=11) DPs, 
while unsuccessful cases had an average of 4.3±2.7. Further, cases with 10 or 11 
DPs present were always successful.
Table 2: Summary statistics for the 11 DPs as defined by Cox et al. (2010).
Design principle (Symbol in parenthesis) Values Total (%) Irrigation 
(%)
Fishery 
(%)
Forestry 
(%)
Clearly defined social boundaries (1A) Missing 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 2 (10%) 0 (0%)
Absence (0) 16 (24%) 6 (25%) 4 (22%) 6 (24%)
Presence (1) 51 (76%) 18 (75%) 14 (78%) 19 (76%)
Clearly defined biophysical boundaries (1B) Missing 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Absence (0) 9 (13%) 4 (17%) 3 (15%) 2 (8%)
Presence (1) 60 (87%) 20 (83%) 17 (85%) 23 (92%)
Congruence between local conditions and rules Missing 7 (10%) 1 (4%) 4 (20%) 2 (8%)
(2A) Absence (0) 26 (42%) 8 (35%) 7 (44%) 11 (48%)
Presence (1) 36 (58%) 15 (65%) 9 (56%) 12 (52%)
Investment/Extraction proportionality (2B) Missing 18 (26%) 2 (8%) 8 (40%) 8 (32%)
Absence (0) 18 (35%) 7 (32%) 5 (42%) 6 (35%)
Presence (1) 33 (65%) 15 (68%) 7 (58%) 11 (65%)
Collective choice arrangements (3) Missing 9 (13%) 0 (0%) 7 (35%) 2 (8%)
Absence (0) 15 (25%) 6 (25%) 2 (15%) 7 (30%)
Presence (1) 45 (75%) 18 (75%) 11 (85%) 16 (70%)
Monitoring (4A) Missing 7 (10%) 2 (8%) 4 (20%) 1 (4%)
Absence (0) 16 (26%) 5 (23%) 4 (25%) 7 (29%)
Presence (1) 46 (74%) 17 (77%) 12 (75%) 17 (71%)
Monitoring the monitors (4B) Missing 17 (27%) 2 (8%) 13 (65%) 2 (8%)
Absence (0) 14 (27%) 7 (32%) 1 (14%) 6 (26%)
Presence (1) 38 (73%) 15 (68%) 6 (86%) 17 (74%)
Graduated sanctions (5) Missing 21 (30%) 6 (25%) 12 (60%) 3 (12%)
Absence (0) 21 (44%) 8 (44%) 4 (50%) 9 (41%)
Presence (1) 27 (56%) 10 (56%) 4 (50%) 13 (59%)
Conflict-resolution mechanisms (6) Missing 13 (19%) 0 (0%) 9 (45%) 4 (16%)
(6) Absence (0) 14 (25%) 6 (25%) 3 (27%) 5 (24%)
Presence (1) 42 (75%) 18 (75%) 8 (73%) 16 (76%)
Rights to organize (7) Missing 7 (10%) 2 (8%) 3 (15%) 2 (8%)
Absence (0) 14 (23%) 2 (9%) 5 (29%) 7 (30%)
Presence (1) 48 (77%) 20 (91%) 12 (71%) 16 (70%)
Nestedness (8) Missing 16 (23%) 0 (0%) 8 (40%) 8 (32%)
Absence (0) 13 (25%) 7 (29%) 1 (8%) 5 (29%)
Presence (1) 40 (75%) 17 (71%) 11 (92%) 12 (71%)
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However, from a simple uni-variate analysis it is unclear whether DPs exhibit 
patterns of co-occurrence, or if specific DP configurations increase the likelihood 
of success. In the next sections we explore co-occurrence visually and configura-
tions via QCA. For example, Figure 1 and Table 3 suggest that either there are other 
variables influencing the success of fisheries or that different activities, joint with the 
natural and hard-human made infrastructure characteristics, require different sets of 
soft human-made infrastructure (i.e. norms, institutions etc.; see Barnett et al. 2016). 
An alternative explanation is that it may be inherently more difficult to analyze or 
determine the presence of DPs depending on CIS characteristics (e.g. mobility of the 
natural infrastructure). While we cannot correct for this issue in our current analysis, 
this is an important methodological question to examine in the future.
3.2. Visualizing co-occurrence of DPs
Figure 2 visualizes the co-occurrence of DPs. We normalize (i.e. divide the num-
ber of times DPs co-occur by the total number of not-successful and successful 
Figure 1: Percentage of successful and unsuccessful cases by number of DPs, shown for all 
cases (top-right), and by activity.
Table 3: Success rate difference depending on activity and number of DPs.
No. of design 
principles
% of successful cases
Irrigation Fishery Forestry
Less than 6 30%   0% 20%
More than 9 86% 100% 83%
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cases) the frequency of co-occurrence of DPs, so as to allow comparison between 
successful and not-successful cases. Figure 2 can be interpreted as a warning 
against assessing DPs in isolation, especially for successful cases. Although there 
is co-occurrence in both non-successful and successful cases, the co-occurrence 
of principles in successful cases is striking. Independently from the natural and 
hard-human made infrastructure characteristics, in successful cases, the presence 
of clearly defined social boundaries (1A) almost always co-occurs with the pres-
ence of clearly defined biophysical boundaries (1B), while others are much less 
likely to co-occur (i.e. nested enterprises (8) and graduated sanctions (5)). Clearly 
defined boundaries (1A and 1B), collective choice arrangements (3) and minimal 
recognition of the rights to organize (7) are very likely to co-occur. When these 
core principles are present, monitors actively audit CPR conditions for appro-
priate behavior (4A) and conflict resolution mechanisms are likely to exist (6). 
Congruence (2A and 2B), in general, seem to co-occur very often in successful 
cases, while they do not co-occur (or occur less) in non-successful cases. Finally, 
nested enterprises (8), graduated sanctions (5) and accountable monitoring of 
monitors (4B) is less likely to occur in successful cases compared to other co-
occurring DPs.
We refine the visualization presented in Figure 2 and depict co-occurrence 
by activity. Figure 3 depicts different co-occurrence patterns for activity for 
non-successful and successful cases. In non-successful cases, clearly defined 
social (1A) and biophysical (1B) boundaries co-occurred more often than other 
DPs. However, in irrigation systems, clearly defined boundaries also often co-
occurred with collective choice (3) and monitoring (4A), while in forestry they 
Figure 2: DPs co-occurrence in cases of successful and non-successful cases (data normalized 
by success). Color (represented by the scale on the right of the figure) indicates the frequency 
of DP co-occurrence scaled between 0 (never co-occur) and 1 (always co-occur) DPs are 
often grouped and co-occur, DPs in isolation do not contribute to success, further, there are 
groups of DPs that seem to co-occur more often in cases of success and are almost completely 
absent in non-successful cases, e.g. DPs 2A and 2B which co-occur very rarely in cases of non-
success. DPs co-occur always with themselves, thus the diagonal is dark red as the frequency 
of co-occurrence=1.
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co-occurred with collective choice (3) and minimal rights to organize (7). Finally, 
in fisheries, clearly defined biophysical boundaries (1B) often co-occurred with 
nested governance structures. The different patterns of co-occurrence are even 
Figure 3: Design principle co-occurrence in successful and non-successful irrigation, fishery, 
and forestry. Data normalized by activity and success – i.e. the number of time DPs co-occur is 
divided by the total cases that are not-successful per activity (left column graphs) or successful 
per activity (right column graph). Color (represented by the scale on the right of the figure) 
indicates the frequency of DP co-occurrence scaled between 0 (never co-occur) and 1 (always 
co-occur). Co-occurrence increases in successful cases and different activities have different 
co-occurrence patterns. Irrigation systems were successful when a very high number of DPs 
co-occur, while fisheries needed a lower number of co-occurring DPs to be successful, with for-
estry cases ranking somewhere in between. The number of DPs needed for success may relate 
to the mobility of the resource, their re-growth rate and by the amount of hard human-made 
infrastructure needed. DPs co-occur always with themselves thus the diagonal is dark red (i.e. 
normalized frequency=1).
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more accentuated in successful cases. Nestedness (8) co-occurred less in success-
ful forestry cases, while in fisheries, monitor accountability (4B) and graduated 
sanctions (5) weakly co-occurred with other DPs. Generalizing, Figure 3 hints 
toward a difference in the necessity of certain DPs for successful governance 
of CPR based on specific activities performed. Fisheries displayed strong co-
occurrence of collective choice arrangements (3), rights to organize (7), congru-
ence (2A 2B), monitoring the resource (4A) and clearly defined boundaries (1A 
and 1B). Forestry systems displayed the presence of almost all DPs, although 
nestedness (8) seemed somewhat less important. Successful irrigation systems 
displayed strong co-occurrence of all DPs. The difference in the co-occurrence 
pattern can very well be caused by differences in the type of system, leading once 
again, to caution against using a cure-all approach without carefully considering 
the overall CIS.
The findings on DP co-occurrence by system type only hint at the inter-
dependencies that characterize CPRs and by extension CIS. However, the analy-
sis performed so far does not distinguish different patterns of DP configuration 
and their relation to success. In the next section we will consider DP configura-
tions using QCA.
3.3. Understanding DP configurations that lead to success
The main result stemming from our previous analysis is that DPs co-occur in 
different patterns depending on activities related to different resource type, and 
that they co-occur more often in successful CPRs. Figures 2 and 3 point out the 
importance of DP 2A and 2B whose co-occurrence is strikingly different in non-
successful vs. successful cases. This suggests that the DPs are interconnected 
and their configurations depend on the CIS in which they are embedded (as also 
pointed out by Ostrom 1990).
We start by assessing the relationship between DP configurations (i.e. sets) 
and success by analyzing only “complete-cases”. Complete cases are cases for 
which all DPs have been coded. Figure 4 summarizes successes and non-suc-
cesses for the complete cases in our dataset.
Figure 4 depicts a clear division between successful and non-successful cases. 
All successful cases have a high number of DPs, however, if we take all cases into 
account (see Figure 1) the division between successful and not successful cases is 
much blurrier (i.e. Figure 4 vs. Figure 1).
Using QCA only on complete cases, we found four sets of DPs leading to suc-
cess by analyzing the complete cases and all activities (see Table A3 for details). 
In most combinations leading to success, DPs 1B, 2B, 4B, and 6 were necessary, 
but not sufficient. Successful cases also display from five to six more DPs than 
unsuccessful ones: (i) 1A, 2A, 4A, 5, and 8; (ii) 1A, 3, 4A, 7, and 8; (iii) 1A, 2A, 
3, 5, 7; or (iv) 1A, 3, 4A, 5, 7, 8. These categories, (i)–(iv), appear to reflect suf-
ficient conditions for success. On the other hand, the absence of 2A, 2B, and 4 
greatly increases the odds of a non-successful CPR system.
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Looking at specific activities (i.e. irrigation, fishery and forestry), QCA gives 
two combinations of DPs leading to success in irrigation and forestry cases, and 
one DP combination for fisheries (Table A3). QCA results also report two com-
binations of DPs leading to non-success in irrigation systems and one in forestry 
and fishery systems. In cases of successful CPR management, irrigation and for-
estry cases contain a solution set that includes all DPs except for nestedness (8) 
and a solution that contains all principles except collective choice arrangements 
(3). All DPs needed to be present for the fishery CPR to be successful. Most 
non-successful CPRs lacked specific DPs: 2A, 2B, 4B and 5. In other words, it 
seems that, generally, all CPRs are likely to be non-successful when congruence 
principles (2A and 2B), accountability of monitors (or monitoring the monitors) 
(4B) and graduated sanctions (5) are absent. However, the absence of specific 
design principles varies depending whether we are looking at irrigation, fishery 
or forestry.
Figure 5 builds on the QCA and displays the frequency in complete cases, fre-
quency when missing values=0 and when missing values=1 (data are reported in 
Table A8) of each DP in successful and not-successful cases. The values assumed 
by each DP in each of the QCA performed is reported and joined by a straight line. 
The length of the line of each DP can be thought of as a “reliability” range of the 
DP for increasing the likelihood of CPR success. DPs located in the top left region 
of the graph are more likely to be present in successful cases, and absent in unsuc-
cessful cases, while DPs located in the top right region of the graph are likely to be 
Figure 4: Percentage of successful and non-successful cases by number of DPs only for cases 
without missing data. Graphs are presented for all cases (top-left), and by activity. Complete 
cases show a clear division between the number of DPs and success/non-success.
14 Jacopo A. Baggio et al.
present in both successful and unsuccessful cases. The visual representation of the 
QCA results reiterates the importance of analyzing DP co-occurrences and hints 
to the importance of specific DPs. While DPs are only effective in combinations, 
certain DPs seem to be more important in facilitating successful CPR governance. 
For example, according to Figure 5 while clearly defined biophysical boundaries 
are necessary for success, they work only if combined with other DPs.
Given the small number of complete cases (see Table A4, A5, A6 and A7 under 
complete cases), any conclusion drawn from QCA analysis needs to be inter-
preted with caution (especially for fisheries). Our reliability analysis increases 
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each DP, we report the average frequency, frequency given in case of missing values=0 and 
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were located in the bottom right region of the graph, they would be prone to be detrimental to 
success (they are disproportionally present in case of non-successful cases and almost always 
non-present in successful cases). This figure highlights the importance of congruence between 
social and environmental conditions and rules and proportionality between investment and 
extraction (2A and 2B).
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the number of cases included in the QCA analysis by assigning a 0 or 1 to miss-
ing values. Table A3 shows the combination of DPs leading to success and to 
“not-success” depending on whether we look only at complete cases, when we 
set missing values=0 and missing values=1 as well as reliability indexes for each 
solution set. Our reliability analysis is a warning against identifying general solu-
tion sets within a system type (see also Figure 5). The reliability of conclusions 
diminishes the confidence in a specific solution set. No DP, alone, leads to suc-
cessful outcomes (i.e. no single DP is sufficient and necessary for success) but a 
combination of more than eight DPs seems to greatly increase the odds of suc-
cess independent of the type of resource. Further, the absence of DPs 2A, 2B, 4B 
and 5 seems to increase the likelihood of non-success. These results confirm the 
importance of designing CPRs without relying on simple assumptions and causal 
pathways. Most of the solutions stemming from the analysis of complete cases are 
only one of several possible avenues to a successful outcome.
4. Discussion
What we have learned from our analysis regarding how DPs interact to affect the 
performance of CPR governance can be organized at two levels, across all activi-
ties and per type of activity analyzed.
4.1. All activities, independent from the hard human made and natural 
infrastructure
DPs work together, not in isolation. The success of a case depends on the type of 
CPR, and a combination of social “infrastructure” that is suitable to the ecologi-
cal conditions. In other words, our analysis reveals the importance of congruence 
between rules and local conditions (2A) and the proportionality between invest-
ment and extraction (2B). As shown in Figure 5, DPs 2A and 2B are present in 
successful cases, and are rarely present in cases where CPR management is not 
successful. This general pattern is observed for all activities. Congruence (2A and 
2B) seems to be the linchpin for success, independent from the type of system. 
Congruence between local conditions and rules seems to highlight the impor-
tance of ecological knowledge of the environment in which a CPR is embedded. 
Proportionality of investment/extraction can be related to the perceived equity 
of allocation rules governing a CPR. The importance of 2A and 2B is also high-
lighted by recent experimental results based on irrigation systems where inequal-
ity plays a key role in determining the level of collective action (see Janssen et al. 
2011; Anderies et al. 2013; Baggio et al. 2015). This result is also confirmed by 
the computational models based on irrigation experiments (Baggio and Janssen 
2013; Janssen and Baggio 2016). In such models, learning another’s behavior, the 
resource dynamics jointly with the proportionality of investment and extraction 
seem to be key features of sustained collective action.
Combining congruence principles with graduated sanctions (5) leads to an 
even higher chance of success. Graduated sanctions is the third piece of the puzzle 
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that is necessary to increase the likelihood of successful CPR. Graduated sanc-
tions are, together with the congruence DPs, the most important determinant of 
successful CPRs independent of specific activities characterized by intensity of 
the hard-human made infrastructure and the mobility of the natural infrastructure.
Our analysis also reveals interesting co-occurrence patterns between specific 
DPs. While the co-occurrence of clearly defined social (1A) and biophysical (1B) 
boundaries can be obvious, the high co-occurrence between collective choice 
arrangements (3) and rights to organize (7) can be evidence of the feedback 
between governments and resource-using communities. Other scholars have sug-
gested that the efficacy of the relationships and interactions between government 
and resource users are highly important for governing resource use (e.g. Pelling 
1998; Adger 2003; Barnett and Eakin 2015). Barnett and Anderies (2014) hypoth-
esized that this combination of factors may mutually reinforce each other, the 
absence of these two principles may weaken the congruence between rules and 
local social and ecological conditions. However, we cannot confirm such hypoth-
eses here, since DPs 3 and 7 seem to have a higher co-occurrence in sets leading 
to non-successful CPRs.
4.2. By activity, dependent on the hard human made and natural 
infrastructure
Although we can affirm that there are core sets of principles that may be fun-
damental to increase success, final outcomes are dictated by DPs that differ 
depending on specific characteristics of the natural and hard human made infra-
structure. The DPs that are necessary for success depend on the type of such 
infrastructural characteristics. For example, monitoring the monitors (4B) is an 
important factor in irrigation and forestry cases, but much less so in fisheries 
(see Figure 5).
The difference in DP importance could very well be related to the mobility of 
the natural infrastructure and the intensity of the hard human-made infrastructure 
(i.e. “technological needs”). The three main activities examined, are classified in 
relation to intensity of hard human-made infrastructure needed, representing the 
effort and investment necessary for specific activities to be performed (from skiffs 
and axes to canals in cement and freezer-trawlers) and resource mobility (from 
forest product and oysters to water in an irrigation system, to tuna).
The mobility of the resource and the static nature of the hard human made 
infrastructure plays an important role in determining the probability of actually 
applying monitoring (4A) programs and the importance of having clearly defined 
social boundaries (1A). Irrigation systems, in many cases, and likely in the cases 
described herein, are often amenable to monitoring. Tail-enders need only to look 
upstream to know why they have little or no water. This ease of monitoring is most 
pronounced in irrigation systems on steep slopes, where visibility is increased, 
and distance between plots of land are smaller (Trawick 2001; Cifdaloz et al. 
2010). Fisheries often encompass large areas of open-sea and mobile fish spe-
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cies, and are thus more difficult to monitor, however, fisheries can also resemble 
farming in case of localized, stationary fishery such as lobsters, oysters and so on. 
Additionally, increasing technical efficiency and the mobility of fishing fleets has 
allowed fishing vessels to extend their effort over larger areas. While fishing com-
munities often self-monitored their fishing grounds adjacent to their shores (e.g. 
Davis 1984; Acheson 1987), the increasing expanse of fishing grounds has made 
this much more difficult, regardless of whether boundaries have been defined or 
not (Barnett and Eakin 2015), hence the importance, for fisheries to be successful, 
to have clearly defined social boundaries (1A).
The difference in monitoring applicability depending on the characteristics 
of the CIS relates also to the actual applicability of graduated sanctions. A hint 
on how graduated sanctions could be applied may be the importance of monitor-
ing the monitors (4B). The importance of DP 4B is also given by its absence as a 
seemingly necessary condition for non-success (in complete cases). Monitoring 
the monitors is a way to increase monitor accountability, since it relates to a higher 
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likelihood of CPR success. Figure 6 summarizes our results and can be thought 
of as a starting point to assess CPR typologies based on intensity of hard human-
made infrastructure, mobility of the natural infrastructure and their relationship 
with soft human-made infrastructure.
To summarize, linking Figure 5 and the QCA analysis to Figure 6 allows 
us to suggest that while there are commonalities across CPRs systems, like 
the need for congruence (2A and 2B), there are also specific soft human-made 
infrastructure that are more important depending on specific CPR character-
istics: graduated sanctions (5) and monitoring (4A and 4B) in high intensity 
hard human made infrastructure systems and a medium level of mobility of 
the natural infrastructure; graduated sanctions (5) and monitoring the monitors 
(4B) in lower intensity hard human made infrastructure and low mobility (or 
none) of the natural infrastructure; clearly defined social boundaries (1A) in 
lower intensity of hard human-made infrastructure and high mobility of natu-
ral. Differences in combination of DPs leading to success and co-occurrence of 
DPs depending on the natural and human hard made infrastructure confirms the 
importance of DPs as a first diagnostic tool to determine the “health” of a CPR. 
However, we need to stress the fact that Figure 6 is only a starting point as it 
applies only to the subset of cases that we have examined here. Our analysis 
looks at irrigation, fishery and forestry activities as a whole. At this stage we 
have not refined our study to take into account whether the canal systems used 
for irrigation activities contain storage units that change the level of mobility of 
the natural infrastructure (Schlager et al. 1994), the type of fishery (i.e. oysters 
-> not mobile, vs. tuna -> very mobile), or the intensity of forestry activities. 
Further we do not look at other dimension of the natural infrastructure (e.g. 
amount and/or diversity). Finally, we also need to clarify that we do not analyze 
cases dealing with pastoralism, groundwater, biodiversity etc. More work is 
needed to assess the validity of such starting point by including a more diverse 
set of CPR systems based on different types of natural and hard human made 
infrastructure.
While we provide an estimate of reliability for the successful combinations 
of DPs, the successful combinations are based only on cases with complete infor-
mation and cannot fully explain the results from the complete dataset (see the 
disparity between Figures 1 and 4, Table A3). Both analyses performed (QCA 
and network visualization) show that cases where all DPs are present have a 
much higher likelihood to be determined as successful CPRs. This analysis also 
indicates that there are important CIS characteristics that reduce the certainty of 
prescribing them in all cases. We recommend caution when applying QCA to 
meta-analysis of case studies based on secondary data sources and for which no 
firsthand information is available. QCA allows us to better understand the mul-
tiple factors that correlate to social and ecological success, but this method must 
be tested for robustness and generalizability to those cases without complete 
information. Albeit the limitations identified, different analysis methods point 
to the same results: there is no panacea, and combinations of DPs are  necessary, 
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but insufficient indicators for successful CPR governance. In a constrained 
 environment, we can still increase the opportunities of successful performance 
by implementing design principles being mindful of the importance of their co-
occurrence and possible causal relationship between them (i.e. clearly defined 
boundaries may be a necessary condition for congruence to occur).
5. Conclusions
The work presented is a first step in using the DPs to build robust governance 
structures into CPR management regimes. Robust governance structures are fun-
damental to navigate and anticipate changes so as to maintain the ability of CPRs 
to function. Our first and probably most obvious conclusion is that DPs should 
not be viewed in isolation. More DPs present in a specific system increase the 
likelihood that the system is successful. Nonetheless, DPs may require further 
unpacking because many are actually combinations of multiple factors them-
selves (Agrawal 2001).
This analysis is another step towards a systemic approach to distinguish dif-
ferent CPR typologies and possible signals leading to success or non-success of 
such systems from a social (i.e. equity and legitimacy, conflict etc.) and ecologi-
cal (avoiding deterioration of resources) perspective. Although, trouble-shooting 
based on DPs alone may not be appropriate for every case and every type of 
resource, our analysis demonstrates that it can definitely be an interesting and 
fruitful approach to governing natural resources. Clearly defined boundaries, con-
flict resolution mechanisms, community participation, feedback between higher 
levels of governance and user communities are all equally important and must 
be present if we are to adaptively manage the complexities of CPRs. Still many 
important and difficult challenges remain; for example, understanding social and 
ecological contexts and factoring alternative explanatory variables. Even more 
work is needed to assess the dynamics and interdependencies between social, 
technical and ecological systems. Analyzing dynamics of these interdependent 
systems is, in our view, a fundamental step to proactively managing CPRs and 
natural resources more broadly.
We are aware that our study may be limited due to the available cases drawn 
upon, our definitions of success (and importance of partial success), and the lack 
of possible important contextual variables. Additionally, our analysis reflects 
a series of snapshots of CPRs, without explicit consideration of time lags and 
change over time. Further investigation into the cases with missing data, either 
through field methods or literature review, could increase the statistical power 
of our results. Additional coding efforts to identify other important contextual 
factors would improve the power of a diagnostic approach to understanding 
social and ecological sustainability. However, we also think that this work is a 
clear first step in looking at the complexities of common pool resources with 
multiple methods, from case study to statistical analysis, to using network anal-
ysis and visual aids.
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6. Supplementary files
Supplementary File 1: http://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.634.s1 S1 Supplementary 
 material. Coding processes, reliability testing and results, and Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) tables.
Literature cited
Acheson, J. M. 1987. The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic and Ecological 
Effects of Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry. In The Question of the 
Commons, eds. B. J. McCay and J. M. Acheson, 37–65. Tucson, AZ, USA: 
University of Arizona Press.
Adger, W. N. 2003. Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to 
Climate Change. Economic Geography 79(4):387–404. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1944-8287.2003.tb00220.x.
Agrawal, A. 2001. Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of 
Resources. World Development 29(10):1649–1672. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S0305-750X(01)00063-8.
Agrawal, A. 2002. Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability. In The 
drama of the commons, eds. E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolšak, P. C. Stern, S. Stovich, 
and E. U. Weber, 41–86. Washington, DC, USA: National Academy Press.
Anderies, J. M. 2015. Understanding the Dynamics of Sustainable Social-
Ecological Systems: Human Behavior, Institutions, and Regulatory Feedback 
Networks. Bulletin of mathematical biology 77(2):259–280. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s11538-014-0030-z.
Anderies, J. M. and M. A. Janssen. 2016. Institutions and the Performance 
of Coupled Infrastructure Systems. International Journal of the Commons 
10(2).
Anderies, J. M., A. A. Rodriguez, M. A. Janssen, and O. Cifdaloz. 2007. Panaceas, 
Uncertainty, and the Robust Control Framework in Sustainability Science. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(39):15194–15199. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702655104.
Anderies, J. M., M. A. Janssen, A. Lee, and H. Wasserman. 2013. Environmental 
Variability and Collective Action: Experimental Insights from an Irrigation 
Game. Ecological Economics 93:166–176. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2013.04.010.
Baggio, J. A. and M. A. Janssen. 2013. Comparing Agent-Based Models on 
Experimental Data of Irrigation Games. In Proceedings of the 2013 Winter 
Simulation Conference, eds. R. Pasupathy, S.-H. Kim, A. Tolk, R. Hill, and 
M. E. Kuhl, 1742–1753, Piscataway, New Jersey, USA: IEEE. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1109/WSC.2013.6721555.
Baggio, J. A., N. D. Rollins, I. Pérez, and M. A. Janssen. 2015. Irrigation 
Experiments in the Lab: Trust, Environmental Variability, and Collective Action. 
Ecology and Society 20(4):12. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-07772-200412.
Explaining success and failures in the commons 21
Barnett, A. J. and J. M. Anderies. 2014. Weak Feedbacks, Governance Mismatches 
and the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems: An Analysis of the Southwest 
Nova Scotia Lobster Fishery with Comparison to Maine. Ecology and Society 
19(4):39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06714-190439.
Barnett, A. J. and H. C. Eakin. 2015. We and Us, not I and Me”: Justice, Social 
Capital, and Household Vulnerability in a Nova Scotia Fishery. Applied 
Geography 59:107–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apgeog.2014.11.005.
Barnett, A. J., J. A. Baggio, H. C. Shin, D. J. Yu, I. Perez-Ibarra, C. A. Rubinos, 
U. Brady, E. Ratajczyk, N. Rollins, R. Aggarwal, J. M. Anderies, and M. A. 
Janssen. 2016. An Iterative Approach to Large-N Studies: Insights from 
Qualitative Analysis of Quantitative Inconsistencies. International Journal of 
the Commons 10(2).
Berkes, F., D. Feeny, B. J. McCay, and J. M. Acheson. 1989. The Benefits of the 
Commons. Nature 340(6229):91–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/340091a0.
Bruns, B. 2007. Community Priorities for Water Rights: Some Conjectures on 
Assumptions, Principles and Programmes. In Community-Based Water Law 
and Water Resource Management Reform in Developing Countries, eds. B. van 
Koppen, M. Giordano, and J. Butterworth, 28–45. Wallingford, UK: CABI. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1079/9781845933265.0028.
Cleaver, F. 2002. Reinventing Institutions: Bricolage and the Social Embeddedness 
of Natural Resources Management. The European Journal of Development 
Research 14(2):11–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714000425.
Cifdaloz, O., A. Regmi, J. M. Anderies, and A. A. Rodriguez. 2010. Robustness, 
Vulnerability, and Adaptive Capacity in Small-Scale Social-Ecological 
Systems: The Pumpa Irrigation System in Nepal. Ecology and Society 
15(3):39.
Cox, M., G. Arnold, and S. V. Tomás. 2010. A Review of Design Principles 
for Community-Based Natural Resource Management. Ecology and Society 
15(4):38.
Davis, A. 1984. You’re Your Own Boss: An Economic Anthropology of Small 
Boat Fishing in Port Lameron Harbour, Southwest Nova Scotia. PhD thesis, 
Toronto, ON, Canada: University of Toronto.
Feeny, D., F. Berkes, B. J. McCay, and J. M. Acheson. 1990. The Tragedy of the 
Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later. Human ecology 18(1):1–19. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/BF00889070.
Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162(3859):1243–1248. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243.
Janssen, M. A. and J. A. Baggio. 2016. Using Agent-Based Models to Compare 
Behavioral Theories on Experimental Data: Application for Irrigation 
Games. Journal of Environmental Psychology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jenvp.2016.04.018.
Janssen, M. A., J. M. Anderies, and J. C. Cardenas. 2011. Head-Enders as Stationary 
Bandits in Asymmetric Commons: Comparing Irrigation Experiments in the 
22 Jacopo A. Baggio et al.
Laboratory and the Field. Ecological Economics 70(9):1590–1598. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.006.
Kent, R. 2009. Case Centered Methods and Quantitative Analysis. In Handbook 
of Case-Based Methods, eds. C. C. Ragin and D. Byrne, 184–207. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.
McEvoy, A. F. 1986. The Fisherman’s Problem: Ecology and Law in the California 
Fisheries, 1850–1980. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. 2007. A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(39):15181–15187. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702288104.
Ostrom, E., A. Agrawal, W. Blomquist, E. Schlager, and S. Y. Tang. 1989. CPR 
Coding Manual. Unpublished manuscript. Available at: https://seslibrary.asu.
edu/sites/default/files/cprcodingmanual-fullwcovercopytoc.pdf.
Ostrom, E., M. A. Janssen, and J. M. Anderies. 2007. Going Beyond Panaceas. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(39):15176–15178. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701886104.
Pelling, M. 1998. Participation, Social Capital and Vulnerability to Urban Flooding 
in Guyana. Journal of International Development 10(4):469–486. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199806)10:4<469::AID-JID539>3.0.CO;2-4.
Poteete, A. R., M. A. Janssen, and E. Ostrom. 2010. Working Together: Collective 
Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice. Princeton, New Jersey, 
USA: Princeton University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400835157.
Schlager, E., W. Blomquist, and S. Y. Tang. 1994. Mobile Flows, Storage, and 
Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources. Land 
Economics 70:294–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3146531.
Steins, N. A. and V. M. Edwards. 1999. Collective Action in Common-Pool 
Resource Management: The Contribution of a Social Constructivist Perspective 
to Existing Theory. Society and Natural Resources 12(6):539–557.
Ragin, C. C. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Ragin, C. C. 2006. Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their Consistency 
and Coverage. Political Analysis 14(3):291–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/
pan/mpj019.
Ragin, C. C. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/
chicago/9780226702797.001.0001.
Ratajczyk, E., U. Brady, J. A. Baggio, A. J. Barnett, I. Perez-Ibarra, N. Rollins, 
C. A. Rubinos, H. C. Shin, D. J. Yu, R. Aggarwal, J. M. Anderies, and M. 
A. Janssen. 2016. Challenges and Opportunities in Coding the Commons: 
Problems, Procedures, and Potential Solutions in Large-N Comparative Case 
Studies. International Journal of the Commons 10(2).
Explaining success and failures in the commons 23
Rocha, J., J. Yletyinen, R. Biggs, T. Blenckner, and G. Peterson. 2015. Marine 
Regime Shifts: Drivers and Impacts on Ecosystems Services. Philosophical 
Transaction of the Royal Society B 370(1659):20130273.
Trawick, P. B. 2001. Successfully Governing the Commons: Principles of Social 
Organization in an Andean Irrigation System. Human ecology 29(1):1–25. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007199304395.
Young, O. R. 2002. The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, 
Interplay, and Scale. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press.
Yu, D. J., M. R. Qubbaj, R. Muneepeerakul, J. M. Anderies, and R. M. Aggarwal. 
2015. Effect of Infrastructure Design on Commons Dilemmas in Social − 
Ecological System Dynamics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
112(43):13207–13212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1410688112.
